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Abstract 
Although the Sevres Treaty was a pathetic document of submission, these heavy conditions 
benefited the national leadership. First of all, it proved to the whole country that the 
independency of the OttomanState could not be mentioned any more. The Ottomans had 
officially admitted their difficulties in representing Anatolia and the people. The people felt 
that this treaty was full of injustices; and the people finally understood the indifferent attitude 
of the Allied States toward Turkey and that everything that had been told to the people by the 
Istanbul governments were all lies. Now even intellectuals who had seemed determined not to 
anger the Allied States had started to see the hope in the Anatolian movement. The angry 
voices rising throughout the country had given Ankara, who had been waiting for this 
moment, a great opportunity. 
Mustafa Kemal had proven to be right once more. Mustafa Kemal had told his friends that 
France, England, and Italy had suffered great losses in the Great War and would not want to 
engage in an Anatolian adventure full of uncertainties; these states could not send even one 
extra soldier to Turkey. The war would be limited with Greece, who could not ignore the one 
million Rums living in Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal was confident that he could thwart the 
Greek military measures. All these factors proved that the Sevres Treaty had no validity from 
the beginning. Likewise, the national movement’s struggle, amid many troubles, would 
confirm this fact; the allied bloc would fall into disagreement and disband, and the 
occupation forces would have to give up their goals about Turkey. 
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Introduction: 
On May 19, a whole new page opened in Turkish history, as the first steps were taken 
in the War of Independence. Mustafa Kemal recounts that he was impatient in the Bandırma 
ship, as he was looking forward to reaching Samsun. The leader was aware of his 
responsibilities and the difficulty of the task he undertook, but he was also confident of the 
final victory. During his first days in Samsun, Mustafa Kemal tried to determine the general 
situation and showed the utmost care not to have any conflicts with Istanbul. The government 
in Istanbul saw no drawbacks in granting his requests and even raised his salary. In Samsun, 
the Rums were the majority in the city center, but the Turks outnumbered them in the whole 
of the province.  
The Rums had gained strength from the English troops’ landing in Samsun. Nearly 
forty Rum gangs were creating an atmosphere of terror in the vicinity of the city, and thirteen 
Turkish gangs formed to counter them. Mustafa Kemal, who frequently communicated with 
Istanbul, used Izmir’s occupation well. He ordered the local administrators that he contacted 
countrywide for protesting the occupation severely, and he organized large public 
demonstrations. The Allied States did not see the Turks as a nation and deemed the national 
forces “pillager gangs.” So this resistance of Allied States had to be broken. The first goal of 
Mustafa Kemal, who knew that a permanent solution could not be achieved through 
demonstrations, was to prevent unfair obstacles such as the occupancy of İzmir by daunting 
the Allies. But the real aim was to remind the Allied States that the Turks were a nation by 
organizing national demonstrations in every region of the country. 
 
The Sevres Treaty 
The years of 1920–1921 was a period in which the Anatolian movement carried on 
the struggle under hard circumstances and many troubles, even though they gained several 
successes. During this same time, Istanbul was strongly displaying their dislike against the 
Anatolian movement with the countrywide disorders they created and almost giving control 
to the occupation forces. Istanbul’s submission would reach its peak with the Sevres Treaty. 
The treaty was signed on August 10, 1920, and consisted of 433 clauses and 150 pages. The 
Ottoman delegation consisted of Hadi Pasha, Dr. RızaTevfik, and ReşatHalisBeys. 
Representatives among the Allies, mainly England, France, and Italy, formed the other side 
of the treaty. English Prime Minister Lloyd George (he was not the official signer) played an 
important role in the treaty; the minister of the exterior Millerand represented the French 
wing of the allied delegation; and the state of emergency ambassador of Paris, Count 
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Longare, represented the Italian wing. Japan was deemed an Allied nation, and Belgium, 
Romania, Serbia, the Croatian-SlovenianKingdom, Armenia, Poland, Portugal, 
Czechoslovakia, and Greece were among the nations that signed the treaty. The main 
characteristic of the treaty was that virtually all of Europe was uniting to cast the Turks out of 
Europe, transforming the TurkishState into a small Anatolian emirate without a future. 
(DURAL,2007:43) 
According to the treaty, Istanbul would be left under Turkish possession and the 
sultan could live in Istanbul if he so wished. Yet how freely could the head of the 
OttomanState live in a city under occupation? The Thracian lands were completely given to 
Greece. The straits would remain under the control of the Allied States, and the Armenian 
and KurdishStates would make the Turkish lands even smaller. The vicinity of İzmir, from 
Ayvalık to Menderes, would be given to Greece. On the regions that were determined as the 
Turkish lands, the Allied States would enjoy great privileges; the TurkishState would be 
dependent on the Allied States economically, politically, and commercially because the 
administration of the straits and the presence of Greece at Ege harmed the sea and railway 
transportations respectively.
1
 (DURAL:78-80) 
Although the Sevres Treaty was a pathetic document of submission, these heavy 
conditions benefited the national leadership. First of all, it proved to the whole country that 
the independency of the OttomanState could not be mentioned any more. The Ottomans had 
officially admitted their difficulties in representing Anatolia and the people. The people felt 
that this treaty was full of injustices; and the people finally understood the indifferent attitude 
of the Allied States toward Turkey and that everything that had been told to the people by the 
Istanbul governments were all lies. Now even intellectuals who had seemed determined not to 
anger the Allied States had started to see the hope in the Anatolian movement. The angry 
voices rising throughout the country had given Ankara, who had been waiting for this 
moment, a great opportunity. 
Ankara’s reaction came without much delay. The parliament assembled under the 
presidency of Mustafa Kemal and stated that the Sevres treaty could not be taken seriously, 
and that this treaty had no legitimacy for the Anatolian government. Even France, who had 
                                                             
1Those who wish to see detailed information about the Sevres Treaty can refer to Reşat Ekrem’s work Osmanlı 
Muahedeleri, which was published in 1934. 
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engaged in armed skirmishes against the Anatolian movement in the south, realized that this 
treaty would not last long. Italy, who had previously grabbed great privileges in Anatolia, felt 
uncomfortable about the rights granted to Greece, and became unwilling to send soldiers to 
support the treaty. England, who was defending the heaviest sanctions against the Turks, was 
hesitant. A wing of the English parliament focused on the financial-economical fault of 
sending even one soldier to Anatolia, and the government was, unlike France, avoiding 
skirmishes against the Anatolian movement. 
Mustafa Kemal had proven to be right once more. Mustafa Kemal had told his friends 
that France, England, and Italy had suffered great losses in the Great War and would not want 
to engage in an Anatolian adventure full of uncertainties; these states could not send even one 
extra soldier to Turkey. The war would be limited with Greece, who could not ignore the one 
million Rums living in Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal was confident that he could thwart the 
Greek military measures. All these factors proved that the Sevres Treaty had no validity from 
the beginning. Likewise, the national movement’s struggle, amid many troubles, would 
confirm this fact; the allied bloc would fall into disagreement and disband, and the 
occupation forces would have to give up their goals about Turkey. 
 
The Turkish-Greek War 
The Turkish-Greek War is mainly examined in the context of three main Axes. In the 
first stage of the war, in 1920, the Greek army had successfully achieved results, as the 
organized Turkish army was still being founded. Turkey even lost Bursa after Istanbul, İzmir, 
and Adana. The second stage took place between 1921–1922. This stage was a defensive war. 
The Turkish army, even though they had suffered strategic land losses, managed to resist the 
endless Greek attacks and caused a dense hopelessness in the Greek army. The Greek army 
acted indecisively, lost its morale, was abandoned by its allies, was struck with terror against 
Mustafa Kemal’s superior abilities, and was scattered in the third phase of the war, which 
took place in 1922. They paid the price of their unjust and irrelevant invasion by being driven 
to the sea at İzmir. The most important common factor of all three stages was the unity of the 
Turkish people and their determination to end the subservience to the foreigners, and the 
army’s success at every area in spite of negative conditions. However, the article will focus 
on the war beginnig from Kutahya- Eskisehir battles because Mustafa Kemal has decided to 
get in charge of the Turkish army after Turks were defeated by Greek army at Kutahya and 
Eskisehir. 
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The Kütahya-Eskişehir Wars and Mustafa Kemal 
Three months had passed since the Second Inönü War. Greece had declared a general 
mobilization and had reinforced the front. However, the Ankara government was not in a 
position to make a call for general mobilization because of the inconveniency of the domestic 
conditions. The front could not be reinforced enough, and the sub-armies and divisions fell 
into a weak state (Martino: 108). The Greek forces realized that they were superior to the 
Turks in condition and started a general offensive on July 10. The situation was bleak for the 
nationalist leadership on July 17. The enemy not only caused heavy losses on the Turkish 
side but also pressed toward Eskişehir from four directions. The Turkish army was routed so 
badly that the people fled to the inner parts of Anatolia in a panic. Even İsmet Pasha was 
affected by this panic and hopelessly thought that the war had been lost. 
Mustafa Kemal understood it was time to take back the situation. He immediately 
went to İsmet Pasha’s headquarters. İsmetBey was truly depressed; Mustafa Kemal thought 
that every difficulty had a solution. He knew they had to think of a solution instead of falling 
into despair. Mustafa Kemal would show that he was the true leader of this war very soon, 
but first he boosted his comrade’s morale: “Good job, İsmet, see, you already won. I want to 
congratulate your victory before the end the fight.” (ATAY,1998: 293) Although he said this, 
Mustafa Kemal also knew that they were defeated. There was now a price to be paid. The 
pasha presumed that the people would want to declare someone responsible -someone to 
punish- for this rout. The easy way would have been to lay the burden of defeat on İsmet 
Pasha, but Mustafa Kemal did not like easy ways. He immediately ordered for the retreat of 
the army by giving a directive, that he took full responsibility of to İsmetBey. Mustafa Kemal 
explains this hard decision as follows: 
 
“After gathering the army at the north and south of Eskişehir, it is necessary to leave a big 
gap with the enemy army for being able to regroup and strengthen the army. You can retreat 
as far as the east of Sakarya for this. If the enemy keeps advancing without a break, they will 
get far away from their base and will have to establish reinforcement organizations again; in 
any situation they will face unexpected difficulties. On the other hand, our army will be 
gathered together and under better conditions. The biggest drawback of this action would be 
a possible spiritual shake in the public opinion because of leaving important locations and 
lands as Eskişehir to the enemy. But these drawbacks would automatically vanish with the 
successful results we could achieve in the shortest time. We have to execute the necessities of 
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war without a hesitation. We can manage facing the other kind of drawbacks.” (ATATURK-
II, 1999: 813–815) 
 
“The Leader Should Have Faith in His Cause under Any Circumstance” 
This was a hard decision to make because the collaborators in Istanbul were seeing 
every step the Kemalist movement took backward as a victory. Also, the occupation forces 
had not yet recognized the Ankara government, and they were losing their desire for contact, 
which was already weak, when they saw the failures of the Anatolian movement. Most 
important of all, there was conflict inside the Anatolian movement now.
2
Some deputies 
accused Mustafa Kemal of wanting a dictatorship. Withdrawing from his position would 
obviously be used against him. Mustafa Kemal could at least be rid of the third danger by 
pointing İnönü as the one responsible for the defeat, but he knew he had to share the routs 
with his comrades along with the victories. 
All of the above-mentioned dangers broke out at once. The Greek government 
claimed that the war was about to end and that the Kemalists would vanish into history. 
Moreover, some Greek newspapers claimed that they could reach victory without the help of 
the Allies. While the Istanbul newspapers stated that retreating had become the fate of the 
Turks, that Mustafa Kemal was destroying his supporters by fighting a losing battle, and that 
the Greek victory overshadowed the former so-called victories. Inside the Anatolian 
movement, the opposition had already created a disorder. Some nationalist deputies had 
become depressed because of the claims of their opponents. The first internal reactions were 
directed toward İsmet Pasha. It was loudly stated from the lectern of the parliament that 
İsmetBey had not won a victory, and the former skirmishes had to be deemed as minor 
events. The ones responsible had to pay. In fact, the opposition indicated that the responsible 
party was Mustafa Kemal, not İsmetBey. In speeches, these internal grumblers accused 
Mustafa Kemal of sending İsmet Pasha to the battlefield and of avoiding responsibility. At 
that moment, the deputy of Mersin, SelahattinBey, came to the lectern and offered Mustafa 
Kemal command of the army. The proposal gained support, but some did not want to give 
Mustafa Kemal an opportunity. This wing strongly opposed the proposal. (DURAL, 
2008:313-330)  
                                                             
2
For detailed information on this subject, the related section of the secondvolume of Nutuk and the 
secondvolume of ŞevketAydemir’s work Tek Adam can be reviewed. 
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The opponents concluded that the struggle was lost. If Mustafa Kemal was at the helm 
of the army, the inevitable disappointment of the defeat would also destroy Mustafa Kemal. 
Mustafa Kemal would be defeated and forgotten; he could not achieve success with the 
ruined. And then the wish of the opponents within the Anatolian movement would come true, 
and the country would make a peace treaty with lighter conditions than the Sevres Treaty. 
Moreover, the Allies were eager for this treaty. Another group also did not want Mustafa 
Kemal to take command of the army. According to this group, the command of Mustafa 
Kemal would mean that all hopes were lost, and the national struggle was in need of a 
miracle. Preserving public opinion would only be possible by keeping Mustafa Kemal for the 
future. However, Mustafa Kemal felt that it was the perfect opportunity he had been waiting 
for. He was eager to accept being the commander-in-chief, but the responsibility could lead a 
man to the gallows. He had to be given concrete authority over the nationalist leadership, 
which would be equal to the burden he was taking. 
He had one more thing on his mind. If he avoided taking over the command, it would 
be the true end of the national struggle. He stated loudly—to his friends and enemies alike—
that he was confident of victory. Avoiding this ordeal would mean that the leader himself did 
not believe in his cause, and this would not befit the character of Mustafa Kemal. He 
accepted the ordeal. His demand was as follows: 
 
“I am accepting the position of commander-in-chief due to the general wish and demands of 
the esteemed members of the parliament. I am taking over the authorities of the Turkish 
National Assembly with the condition of actively using them, in order to quickly achieve the 
benefits which will rise with this act, to increase and strengthen both the spiritual and 
physical force of the army, and to strengthen its administration even more. I also wish this 
authority to be limited for a short period like three months in order to display that I am a true 
servant of the national sovereignty as long as I live to the nation.” (ATATURK-II: 81) 
 
Major Battle of Sakarya 
The tactic was successful. Every word had been chosen carefully. First of all, he had 
proved that he would not avoid hard duties and he would take the greatest risks in the most 
dire situations. He also realized that some of his opponents wanted to send him to the front to 
gain control in Ankara in his absence and to overthrow him at his slightest failure. Leaving 
the administration to his opponents was not something he enjoyed. But he had undertaken 
both military and political leadership. And now his opponents would humiliate him by 
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accusing him of being a dictator. He had to set a short limit for the state of emergency and 
direct all weapons of his opponents toward them. Mustafa Kemal achieved all this in his 
speech of six or seven lines. 
Mustafa Kemal arrived at the front with Fevzi Pasha on August 12, 1921. The Greek 
army started their assault on August 23. The battle occurred in a hundred-kilometer area. The 
enemy was making heavy assaults toward the left flank of the Turkish forces. This wing 
retreated fifty kilometers south of Ankara; the defensive lines were broken from time to time, 
but Mustafa Kemal confused the enemy with his sudden decisions to move the army in 
different directions. The skirmishes were carried on in constant motion. The Greek 
commanders present in this battle would later narrate the hard conditions they had faced 
during this battle:“How were those positions fortified, that the battle continued for such a 
long time and a wide scale? How much force had the Turks separated for the defense of these 
positions? Why could not the main forces of the Greek army be able to scatter and defeat 
them?” (AYDEMIR-II,1999: 449) 
In fact the ridges of Sakarya were neither dug nor fortified. It seems that the enemy 
was not able to perceive the Turkish tactic once again. Mustafa Kemal had deployed the plan 
quickly after seeing that the defense was being broken; the army had to continuously change 
its position, as it was being attacked from all directions. He gave the following order: “There 
is not a defense of lines but there is the defense of an area, and that area is the whole 
country. Even a single inch of the country can‟t be left before it is wet with our citizens‟ 
blood. Therefore, small or large any part of the whole can be driven away from its position. 
But, small and large every part of the whole will form a front against the enemy again and 
continue the fight on the first spot they can stop. The parts which see that a nearby part had 
to retreat cannot act similarly. They are obliged to persevere and resist at their positions 
until the end.” 
The Battle of Sakarya started on August 23 and continued for twenty-two nights and 
days without a break. During the battle, Mustafa Kemal fell from the horse and broke his ribs. 
Sometimes he had to watch the battle from a stretcher. Mustafa Kemal’s victories could not 
be stopped by any fever, shrapnel, or horse. One problem the Turks faced was difficulty 
supplying ammunition to fronts that had split up during the battle. Mustafa Kemal ordered the 
lines without ammunition to continue fighting with bayonets and even the knives in their 
pockets, and his orders were carried out by the heroic soldiers. Mustafa Kemal and 
İsmetİnönü were aware that the enemy had moved far from their base and made plans 
considering this fact. During the first days of the battle, the Turkish army struggled not to be 
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completely encircled and destroyed. The Greek forces moved even farther away from their 
bases, chasing the retreating troops, and their communication network weakened and their 
ammunition decreased. The result of this would be depression and fatigue. The Turkish army 
waited for the enemy’s vulnerable moment, and then they would land the final blow. 
On the eve of the Sakarya Battle, which is counted among the bloodiest wars in 
history, İsmet Pasha met with Mustafa Kemal and distributed the army. According to this 
distribution, the Turkish army would stop the enemy with seven divisions and would leave 
seven divisions and five cavalry divisions as reserves. Two cavalry divisions would move 
behind the enemy and would ruin the order and supplying conditions of the Greek army. The 
cavalry units had already made countless raids against the Greek forces, had roughed up the 
enemy forces, and had put lone units to the sword. (MARTINO,1998: 120–121) 
The bloodiest skirmishes took place on August 25. The Greek army started an 
incredible offensive to capture the peak of Çaldağı and succeeded in capturing the mountain, 
but Mustafa Kemal’s battle plan had worked. The Turkish front did not split against the 
attacks. The Greek soldiers, who had gone too far from their base, started to wear down by 
August 31. Even though they had considerable food and equipment, they were not able to 
make the coordination. The power of the offensive was declining. By the first days of 
September, the Greek forces were acting indecisively and were making fruitless attacks. 
General Papulas gave the order of general retreat to the enemy army on September 10, which 
had started to slowly retreat on September 8. The enemy had been left in a weak and 
demoralized state, and the expected time had come. But Mustafa Kemal was still cautious. 
The cavalries had caused the enemy incredible losses. The Turkish forces gained the control 
of Kartaltepe, Duatepe, and Beştepe on September 12. The Turkish assault forces managed to 
drive the enemy back at the cost of vanishing. Ankara received the telegraph of victory on 
September 12 and learned that the enemy was completely cleared from the east of Sakarya on 
September 13, 1921. Toynbee, who wrote the foundation story of the Republic of Turkey, 
interpreted the Battle of Sakarya as follows: 
 
“This time the Turkish Army was commanded by Mustafa Kemal and his assistant was 
İsmetBey. The battle lasted for 3 weeks without a break with heavy skirmishes. The leader of 
the Turks was frequently in the middle of the battlefield; and once he was severely wounded. 
The Turks and Greeks were fighting face to face. This was a horrible skirmish between 
almost equal powers. This was indeed the battle for supremacy of the East and the West, of a 
Westernized state and the new Turkey. After three weeks, the Greeks could not break the 
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resistance of the Turks and they first had to give up their hopes of advancing further and then 
had to retreat against the Turkish nationalists, whom had started a counter-offensive. 
 
The Greeks had become depressed. The order of general retreat was given on 16 September.
3
 
The defeated Greeks were continuously burning down the villages on their way while 
retreating. On the 23
rd
 of the month they had retreated as far as their old positions on the 
Eskişehir-Afyon line. They had been unsuccessful in achieving their goals and the Turks had 
won their second major victory. Nevertheless, this was not a decisive one, as the Greek Army 
had not been destroyed; but it had given the necessary boost of morale to the Turks. The 
situation in the Turkish-Greek war had changed totally with the Battle of Sakarya. It can be 
said that this war was one of the greatest battles in the history of the current century.
4
 The 
one year period that followed this war, gave a quite long time for the Turks to regroup and 
strengthen their forces.” (TOYNBEE-II, 2000: 15–16) 
 
According to the Greek records, 5,227 Greek soldiers were either dead or lost during 
the battle. Mustafa Kemal had confronted his enemy with a brilliant tactic and stopped 
Greece’s plans to seize Ankara, saving the capital of the new Turkey too, after having saved 
the capital of the Ottoman State. Mustafa Kemal thus silenced the ravings of both the Istanbul 
government and his opposition in the national movement and reduced the assault power of 
the Greek forces to nothing. Greece, who had attempted an unjust invasion because of the 
occupation forces and especially England, could only wait for their inevitable end without 
any offensive capability. 
After the Battle of Sakarya, Mustafa Kemal was met with a great enthusiasm at 
TBMM. He was given the titles of “Marshal” and “Gazi (victorious fighter for the Islamic 
faith).” Meanwhile, mediators from the occupation forces informed Ankara that Greece was 
ready to withdraw from Anatolia, but this could only be done in return for some concessions 
at Thrace. It was unthinkable for TBMM, who for the first time had the upper hand against 
                                                             
3
Most historians state that the order of general retreat was given on September10. Nutuk also emphasizes that 
the region was completely cleared on September13. 
4Here, Toynbee attributes this to Price’s book The Rebirth of Turkey. 
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the Greek army, to make any concessions to Greece. However, the best result of the Battle of 
Sakarya had been the recognition of the Ankara government by France. 
France felt uneasy about both Gaziantep and Çukurova. FranclinBauillion, a former 
minister of this country, had arrived in Ankara on June 9, 1921. France wanted to come to an 
agreement with Ankara. This result could only be achieved after the Battle of Sakarya, which 
had officially started on July 13. Without even informing England France abandoned their 
intentions for Anatolia, even though they were aware that this country would react harshly, 
with the Treaty of Ankara, which was signed on October 20, 1921. France withdrew from 
Gaziantep on October 25 and Adana on January 5 (Koçu: 273–291). The other occupation 
force, Italy, had given up the Anatolian adventure before France. For the nationalist 
leadership, it was now time to end the problem of Greece, which had already fallen into a 
difficult state. 
 
The Great Attack 
The conditions of the general mobilization were hard. In fact, some countries formed 
relations with Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey. The Indian Muslims had helped from time to time, 
and the relations with the USSR had been friendly, but nevertheless Ankara was introverted 
and excluded from the rest of the world. Mustafa Kemal knew the importance of the final 
blow. He did not have any intention of hurrying and getting stuck at the front. The parliament 
had calmed down after the Battle of Sakarya but had started to get agitated when the order for 
attack did not come and the list of preparations for the battle extended. Some deputies asked 
why the final blow still had not been delivered to the Greek army. According to this group, 
every single day that passed meant that the enemy was digging new trenches and taking 
defensive measures. However, since the Çanakkale War, Mustafa Kemal was aware that 
victory would not be won by weaving barbed wires, 
Another factor that caused difficulties for Ankara was the insufficiency of 
transportation. The records of the front displayed the number of soldiers who died in 
hospitals were much greater than those who died on the battlefields. The army struggled 
against a pneumonia epidemic. According to the Department of Health datum, the number of 
infected had raised to 247.988 in 1922, while it had been 151.783 in 1921. Medicine could 
not be dispatched to some units. The railway started in Istanbul and ended at Ankara. The 
national forces controlled only a small proportion of the railway, which started east of 
Eskişehir, while other lines were inconvenient for the battle plans. During the Inönü battles, 
transportation from Eskişehir to Ankara took more than twenty hours. A dispatch from 
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İnebolu to Ankara could only be completed in a week. It was necessary to be cautious while 
preparing for the final victory under such heavy conditions. Mustafa Kemal considered this 
datum and carried on preparations for the battle, even with negative signals coming from the 
parliament. 
The calculations showed that it was necessary to concentrate at least 100,000 armed 
soldiers, 4,000 machine guns, horses for the cavalry, fodders for the horses, and ammunition 
that would allow the firing of the guns for days at the front (Kerim: 177). Mustafa Kemal told 
the Russian General Fronze, whom he had met in Ankara in early 1922, that if they could not 
overcome the shortages in two or three months, the only option would have to be a 
diplomatic solution. Turkey had started preparations immediately after the Battle of Sakarya, 
but, although they were expected to be ready in a relatively short time, it was not for the 
above-mentioned reasons. 
 
The Leadership of Mustafa Kemal Is Being Discussed 
Mustafa Kemal had undertaken the commander-in-chief duty under extraordinary 
conditions, but he was frequently criticized because of the amount of power he commanded. 
Every parliament session about the extension of “Supreme Military Command Law” was a 
major event. The most exciting one occurred on May 5. The opponents had managed to 
secure the rejection of the extension of the commander-in-chief law without the necessary 
majority. The decision started an official discussion concerning Mustafa Kemal’s leadership. 
Moreover, some deputies disdained the army and verbally attacked the national leadership—
and the words of these opponents met with applause. However, Mustafa Kemal was 
determined to keep his authority at all costs. The parliament would assemble again the next 
day, and Mustafa Kemal would inform the deputies. 
Mustafa Kemal’s explanations to the complaints against his leadership were quite 
harsh. The opponents had showed their teeth; now it was Mustafa Kemal’s turn. He started by 
stating that some people who spent their time creating disorder in the parliament had started 
to do it again. Mustafa Kemal reminded them that the opponents found the existence of a 
commander-in-chief on duty, due to state of emergency laws, unnecessary and emphasized 
that the current deputies and TBMM itself worked under extraordinary conditions. The most 
interesting parts of Mustafa Kemal’s speech can be summarized as follows: 
 
“No gentlemen, our most important and basic duty is not making politics. Today, the sole 
duty of us, the whole country and nation is discarding the enemy from our lands with our 
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bayonets. As long as we have not done this yet, politics will remain meaningless. …I am not 
one of those who accept the theory of keeping our army‟s existence and strength balanced 
with our fortune. „We have money, so we can build an army; we are out of money, let‟s 
disband the army…‟ there is no such a thing for me. Gentlemen, we can either have money or 
not; but no matter we have the money or not, there is an army and there will be. Let me recall 
a memory at this point. When I started this work for the first time, some so-called wise and 
intellectual people asked me: „Do we have money and guns?‟ I said: „No.‟ Then they said: 
„What are you going to do then?‟ and I replied: „We will have money, we will have an army, 
and this nation will save its independence.‟ As you see, all of these became and will become 
true. 
 
And some gentlemen had said that: „The Commander-in-chief is forcing the nation to do 
unpaid obligatory work; however this is forbidden by laws in the country.‟ Gentlemen, this is 
true; but it is necessity and danger that what shows everything as legal to us. If the shortages 
of the army is forcing us to make the nation do unpaid obligatory work, we are doing so, and 
this is the most rightful law. I will not hesitate because of the „limitations of law‟ in taking the 
necessary measures for avoiding the defeat of the army and the nation. … VasıfBey had said 
in one of his speeches that: „After the Battle of Sakarya, we could not even move until now, 
and we are not still able to.‟ This phrase was met with „Long live‟ shouts and applauds of 
some. 
 
Gentlemen, I felt a great sorrow and bitterness because of this; I felt ashamed. Applauding 
the words of a heedless who claims that the army is standing still and is unable to move is 
really very weird. Please, let this die here, no one shall hear of it! 
 
You see gentlemen, the major phrases said for proving that the position of commander-in-
chief is unnecessary are these. You have also heard my answers against these words. Now, it 
is the parliament‟s duty to think and come to a decision. But, I have to display a truth. Even 
though there is no doubt about the parliament‟s belief about the necessity of the commander-
in-chief position, the baseless activities of the opposition caused an unwanted parliament 
decision to come to force. Gentlemen, do you know the result of this? The position of 
Commander-in-chief is remaining in suspense and uncertainty for two days. The army does 
not have a commander right now. If, I am not leaving the command of the army, I am doing it 
illegally. I would want to withdraw from the command immediately according to the votes 
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given in the parliament. I have also informed the government that my commander-in-chief 
duty was over. However, I faced the obligation to cause an inevitable evil. Our army, which 
is facing the enemy, could not be left without a leader. Therefore, I did not leave my position, 
I cannot leave it, and I will not be able to.” (ATATURK-II: 877–883) 
 
Mustafa Kemal acquired the results he wanted with this harsh speech. He had 
examined the declarations of his opponents, prepared the necessary answers against them, 
and had gained control in TBMM before the voting in a very short time. Likewise, the voting 
resulted with the extension of the commander-in-chief law by 177 votes, with 11 against and 
15 abstaining votes. The next step would be removing the Greek army from Anatolia. 
In the Great Offensive, the front’s width was 600 kilometers. Mustafa Kemal had 
warned the Turkish forces not to spread too much. He did not want to fall into the same trap 
the Greek armies had in former battles. Between the battles, the mood had lightened in the 
Greek posts, and duties were being neglected. Nevertheless, the Turks could only gather an 
army of 103,000 men against the enemy’s military force, which reached 130,000 men. The 
Turkish army had more than 200 cannons, and 50 of these were heavy cannons. The Turkish 
committee of command depended mainly on an offensive that would start with the support of 
heavy cannon fire (MECHIN, 2001: 191). 
 
On the Road to Victory 
Even the parliament was unaware of Mustafa Kemal’s offensive plans. The 
commander-in-chief kept even the smallest bit of information from Greek intelligence. The 
operation plans were only known by İsmet, Fevzi, and Kazım Pashas. The front would be 
organized without the enemy’s notice, and the raid would be executed instantaneously. The 
sub-army and divisions began marching toward the given concentration points on August 13. 
They reached the concentration points on August 25 by secretly moving at night; the soldiers 
rested after sunrise. 
Mustafa Kemal thought of focusing the main force of his army on one wing of the 
enemy front. The goal was to destroy the enemy with a field battle. The main forces would 
gather at the AkarÇay-Dumlupınar zone near Afyon and strike the enemy wing at this zone. 
Mustafa Kemal went to Akşehir on the night of July 23, with the excuse that he was meeting 
General Townshand, who had come to Konya. The football match, which was organized for 
July 28, was camouflage for a meeting with the commanders. They decided that preparations 
for the offense would be conducted until August 15. Mustafa Kemal returned to Ankara after 
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the principles of the offense plans were set, and secret orders were sent to the units on August 
6 to be ready for the assault. On August 13, the army chief of staff FevziÇakmak arrived at 
the front. Mustafa Kemal delayed his departure from Ankara to make a final evaluation of the 
situation. Mustafa Kemal secretly left Ankara. He noted in the newspaper that he was giving 
a tea party at Çankaya on the day he left to keep his movement secret. The preparations were 
so secret that Mustafa Kemal had gone to Konya overland instead of by train, and he had the 
telegraph office workers under surveillance as soon as he arrived in the city. No one would 
learn where he was until the offensive started. On the evening of August 20, he met 1st and 
2nd army commanders, the front commander, and the army chief of staff. They reviewed 
their strategy on a map. On August 24, the headquarters of the front had been moved to the 
town of Şahut from Akşehir. And it had reached Kocatepe on August 26. The offensive 
would started at 5:30 AM with heavy cannon fire support. 
The skirmisher units had advanced in the darkness and had come as close as four or 
five hundred meters to the enemy trenches. The Turkish army entered the enemy positions at 
KalecikSivrisi and west of it at 5:30; they had taken TınazTepe within an hour. However, 
there were problems at Belen. Some units had retreated. The 23rd Division had been too slow 
to act. Mustafa Kemal reproved the division commander. Nevertheless, the hill fell at 9:00. 
Mustafa Kemal sent the news that the Turkish army had launched an attack to Ankara at 
10:00 AM.
5
 
The enemy’s resistance was still strong, even though some important hills had been 
taken on August 26. The Greek army had not split up. On August 27, Mustafa Kemal’s 
operation plan was executed perfectly, and the first targets fell. The enemy was driven to the 
Sincanlı Plain, and the cavalry forces entered Afyon. However, the 57th Division 
commander, Major ReşatBey, who had been ordered to seize control of Çiğli Hill, made his 
failure a matter of honor and committed suicide. On August 26–27, the enemy’s fortified 
lines that extended for fifty kilometers on the south and twenty to thirty kilometers on the east 
of Afyon were left out of war. The Greek army had executed some successful actions but 
nothing decisive. On August 28, the enemy tried to retreat to İzmir, but the Turkish army 
carried on in encircling and destroying the Greek forces with even greater strength. August 
                                                             
5
Aydemir claims that the famous photograph of Mustafa Kemal at Kocatepe, was taken while he was going to 
reprove the 23. Division’s commander. 
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29 passed with constant skirmishes. The Greek forces could not carry out the counter-offense 
order they had received, as they were immobilized. 
While the Greek forces that scattered were destroyed by the Turkish cavalry before 
they could regroup, the Greek commander Trikopis’s maneuvering area was also being 
constricted by the systematic attacks of some Turkish forces. İsmet Pasha was about to 
finalize the encircling movement when Mustafa Kemal arrived at Adatepe on the night of 
August 29. İsmet Pasha had attacked the middle part of the Greek front at Afyonkarahisar on 
August 16, according to the battle plan. The Turkish army had advanced forty kilometers 
until August 29. The scattered Greek forces tried to resist at Dumlupınar, but they failed and 
were scattered again. The plan that Mustafa Kemal had made with Fevzi and İsmet Pashas on 
August 29 was successfully executed the next day. The Greek forces fled. The Greek forces 
would try to hold on at Uşak as a last resort, but they would not be able to escape their 
destiny (Toynbee-II: 20). Mustafa Kemal examined the battlefield on August 31. He made a 
final evaluation of the situation with İsmet and Fevzi Pashas and then gave his famous order: 
 
 
 
“The armies of the Turkish National Assembly! 
 
On the great field battle of Afyonkarahisar-Dumlupınar, you have proven worthy of our great 
and generous nation‟s sacrifices, by destroying the main elements of a tyrannical and 
conceited army in an unbelievably short time. …I ask from all of my friends to keep in mind 
while they advance that there will be more field battles fought in Anatolia, and from everyone 
to continue displaying their mental power, braveness and patriotism as if we were in a 
competition. 
 
The Armies! Your first target is the Mediterranean. Forward!” (YDEMIR-II: 487–488) 
 
It was impossible for the Greek army to keep Uşak in their current state. When the 
Turkish cavalries entered the Greek headquarters at Uşak on September 2, they had left too 
few moves for Trikopis. The Turkish army had taken General Trikopis and the general staff 
committee prisoner, and the final fragments of morale were replaced by hopelessness. The 
Greek soldiers fled toward İzmir. setting the villages they passed ablaze. Martino claims that 
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the Greek losses reached 68,000 during the war, and 17,000 Greek soldiers were taken 
prisoner by the Turkish forces (Martino: 138). 
 
Conclusion: Mustafa Kemal at İzmir 
The Turkish army advanced without serious resistance after Uşak. On September 4 
the proposal came for a truce—in return for the evacuation of the Greek soldiers from 
Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent the Turkish response to the president of executive 
deputies, RaufOrbay. He wrote that there was no need for a truce over Anatolia anymore, as 
the Greek army had already been destroyed. The army reached the Mile line on September 6 
and Manisa on September 8. The Turkish army took İzmir on September 9 and liberated 
Bursa on September 10. Meanwhile, the İtilaf states at İzmir had sent a message to Mustafa 
Kemal Pasha, negotiating the handing over of the city to the Turks. Mustafa Kemal accepted 
the proposal. They would meet at Kemalpaşa on September 9. Mustafa Kemal mockingly 
describes the event in Speech:  
 
“On my answer, I had informed him that we could meet at Nif on 9 September 1922. I was 
indeed present at Kemalpaşa (Nif) on that day, but the ones who wanted the meeting were 
not. Because, our armies had reached the first target I had set for them, Akdeniz (the 
Mediterranean Sea), on the quay of İzmir.” (ATATURK-II: 903) 
 
Upon entering the city, he toured the waterfront part of İzmir and then he visited the Kramer 
Hotel. The war had been won, and this victory was worth celebrating. Mustafa Kemal lived a 
colorful life and knew how to live at war and at peace. Thereon the Turkish will begin to 
think about the peace process and the revolutions period which will come afterwards in order 
to form a modern state. 
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